市场评论

小曲

下面是九月八号Conference call 对市场评论的总结，贴出来，希望对大家有帮助。

Market Commentary
$ ~4 j/ P2 L7 j% TEric Bushell, Chief Investment Officer
) O$ N1 _- m/ y. P  ?. uJames Dutkiewicz, Portfolio Manager
Signature Global Advisors
& W4 Y9 Z7 [6 f* P: p6 i0 n

2 U$ V/ [7 o/ Q. J0 v2 EBackground remarks
, S, [; v$ m0 `$ ]8 M  m* K Governments’ costs associated with stabilizing the crisis, including recent government stimulus programs, are
as much as 20% or even 60% of GDP.
$ K2 R- ?4 R2 @1 n# U" P Some governments have reached limits of sustainable debt loads and markets are beginning to insist on fiscal
6 c9 [* G; J; y7 J1 fadjustments.
 This marks the beginning of what will be a turbulent social and political period, where elements of the social
8 }2 n4 {9 v/ o+ Vsafety nets in Western economies are no longer affordable and must be defunded.
  j5 K& z8 o6 w* [5 G2 ]7 ^ Templates for fiscal adjustment are appearing in peripheral and core Europe, the U.S. and elsewhere. There are
* p8 E5 }7 j& C5 B& v0 Rlessons to be learned from the frontrunners.
 We see policy interventions playing a bigger role in financial markets. Policymakers are trying to ease these
8 S  h& d* g* I5 s  S/ a4 [adjustments for governments and consumers as they deleverage.
/ U4 S. N4 h8 q Policy interventions are shaping markets more than fundamentals. Examples include the U.S. Federal Reserve’s
quantitative easing (QE2) program and the ECB intervention in the European sovereign bond market.
6 ]. X6 Z% I8 X2 }; y$ o Developed financial markets have now priced in lower levels of economic growth.
$ y& U! t6 {1 G/ V9 k Credit markets are now less resilient to shocks because of Basel III and the Dodd-Frank bill. Brokers have
reduced capacity to hold risk. Therefore, risk shedding by others is going to have a greater impact.

小曲

Current situation
 The lesson we learned from the 2008-2009 credit crunch is how credit markets affect stock valuations. As long
as funding markets stay open, equities are valued as going concerns. But if credit markets close, markets may
) S6 l$ q- @" |, ?impose liquidation values.
/ I+ J0 \* x5 F In the summer, the European credit crisis caused another round of market worries about a credit shutdown. In
- o1 |. D2 R' p5 p1 v  nAugust, we said a credit shutdown was unlikely – we continue to hold that view.
 The collapse of interest rates on 10-year Treasuries to 2% leaves banks, insurance companies and pension
- K: U- ]1 W; b: mscrambling for higher yields to satisfy their obligations – this is supportive of corporate bond markets.

A look at credit markets
 Investment grade – $17 billion in new issues were placed last Wednesday. We’re expecting $80-$100 billion in
September. Non-financial investment grade is the new safe haven.
 High yield – In March, the spread above governments was 450 basis points, today it’s 740 bps. Yields were 7%
then, now they are 8.5%. New issuance has been about $30 billion a month, although August saw only $1
( @( L% F3 o: z- t0 I6 ?billion. That said, the market is still open. Risk has been repriced – but appropriately priced issues still have
access to the market. There are only two parts of the global bond market having difficulty – ultra-low-grade
CCC issues and European high yield, which are both down about 2.5% year-to-date. All other bond markets are
1 }; w7 W8 m5 `* ]) _3 |positive for the year-do-date, including high yield.
8 l7 _7 k8 @; b9 W# p Mortgages – There is no funding for new construction, but existing quality properties are having no trouble
finding financing.
 Commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) – In the summer, there were two failed transactions, but they
were subsequently repriced and placed. In the fall, there will be more deals.
, P3 |) w+ L0 Z9 S/ J Leveraged floating rate collateralized loans – The index was trading at $90 last September, $96 in March and
9 j' v* ^- Q7 C, `  k; ]: r$ gis now back to $90. Changes were a result of interest rate expectations (people thought that interest rates were
' K! y% V* O% h5 K' egoing up) rather than liquidity. Chapter 11 companies have no problem getting secured and when they file for
bankruptcy, they already have debt financing in place.
 European banks – European bank lending conditions are tighter. This is the weakest link in the financial chain
9 u+ }7 }& V: ntoday.
: f% W- C) Q- q; v. V2 C/ }  g3 g Emerging markets – Sovereign rates have rallied along with U.S. Treasuries. High-grade corporates in
emerging markets have no problem with funding.

小曲

European Union agenda
 Europe is frantic and will remain so for at least another four months – which is what we see as the timeline for
. M- b5 X" u) Rthe Greek default.
 As we see it, the following firewalls need to be put in place:
1. Making sure that banks have enough capital and deposit insurance to survive a Greek default
+ |$ M8 B8 q4 S7 l9 e( l2. The European Financial Stability Facility, which is to be used for the bank capital injection and sovereign
: F, v! U# R$ s& gdebt stabilization, needs government approvals.
3. Measures of assistance to help European banks to make $1.7 trillion in refinancing easier and allowing
: }# d4 ^2 F; T, P4 E9 {  t) ebanks to shrink their balance sheets over three years
1 R! V) w3 E$ K8 G4. More fiscal reform for Spain, Italy and France is a precondition for stable sovereign debt markets.

( L# [/ s/ h# xBeyond Greece
 The EFSF #2 plan announced in July was a toolkit to deal with the PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain),
but that was before Italy.
 It provided a $500-billion loan program, but $250 billion was already spoken for by the PIGS.
 It’s an undersized framework and if negative growth/interest rate dynamics keep investors from sponsoring the
Italian bond market, the EU crisis will escalate further.

: L% _6 N& i. a8 n( [Conclusion
  X( M  |$ M! u9 H3 y% } We want to have safeguards in place and continue to be liquid, so that we can capitalize on future turbulence.

yuz967

kasnkan