市场评论

小曲

下面是九月八号Conference call 对市场评论的总结，贴出来，希望对大家有帮助。

Market Commentary
1 c$ P% O" v: z/ x7 K9 e' d/ Y8 N' TEric Bushell, Chief Investment Officer
James Dutkiewicz, Portfolio Manager
0 p# J4 \5 d2 p! q0 CSignature Global Advisors

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Background remarks
! W, B1 m' h) C  e Governments’ costs associated with stabilizing the crisis, including recent government stimulus programs, are
4 X) Y# c; ^+ n1 p+ t3 ?7 fas much as 20% or even 60% of GDP.
 Some governments have reached limits of sustainable debt loads and markets are beginning to insist on fiscal
adjustments.
3 o/ _* s6 N" B This marks the beginning of what will be a turbulent social and political period, where elements of the social
safety nets in Western economies are no longer affordable and must be defunded.
 Templates for fiscal adjustment are appearing in peripheral and core Europe, the U.S. and elsewhere. There are
lessons to be learned from the frontrunners.
  g- M+ X/ F- c8 y# U% f We see policy interventions playing a bigger role in financial markets. Policymakers are trying to ease these
5 O  f, j) D! n& l1 W/ Radjustments for governments and consumers as they deleverage.
 Policy interventions are shaping markets more than fundamentals. Examples include the U.S. Federal Reserve’s
quantitative easing (QE2) program and the ECB intervention in the European sovereign bond market.
 Developed financial markets have now priced in lower levels of economic growth.
 Credit markets are now less resilient to shocks because of Basel III and the Dodd-Frank bill. Brokers have
5 E$ b4 H' t7 o. w- \2 n5 c' jreduced capacity to hold risk. Therefore, risk shedding by others is going to have a greater impact.

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Current situation
 The lesson we learned from the 2008-2009 credit crunch is how credit markets affect stock valuations. As long
1 T7 i1 S9 B: C9 \0 u" V; t+ Sas funding markets stay open, equities are valued as going concerns. But if credit markets close, markets may
0 P/ H0 m4 S4 W! o  d6 R+ `impose liquidation values.
 In the summer, the European credit crisis caused another round of market worries about a credit shutdown. In
6 e! J0 t5 I% b0 S! VAugust, we said a credit shutdown was unlikely – we continue to hold that view.
 The collapse of interest rates on 10-year Treasuries to 2% leaves banks, insurance companies and pension
scrambling for higher yields to satisfy their obligations – this is supportive of corporate bond markets.
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4 I+ }( _  e& M0 iA look at credit markets
 Investment grade – $17 billion in new issues were placed last Wednesday. We’re expecting $80-$100 billion in
September. Non-financial investment grade is the new safe haven.
+ c2 y7 K7 M8 Q1 O4 \ High yield – In March, the spread above governments was 450 basis points, today it’s 740 bps. Yields were 7%
then, now they are 8.5%. New issuance has been about $30 billion a month, although August saw only $1
3 t7 s  C& f9 n1 e; ?$ \+ Y- {billion. That said, the market is still open. Risk has been repriced – but appropriately priced issues still have
access to the market. There are only two parts of the global bond market having difficulty – ultra-low-grade
0 l, o) M# k; U2 n2 CCCC issues and European high yield, which are both down about 2.5% year-to-date. All other bond markets are
0 ^; p% f. g  d1 {positive for the year-do-date, including high yield.
 Mortgages – There is no funding for new construction, but existing quality properties are having no trouble
, A+ g; e- H, `3 B# X6 Dfinding financing.
 Commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) – In the summer, there were two failed transactions, but they
' O  {3 ^' ]9 f3 j+ F: rwere subsequently repriced and placed. In the fall, there will be more deals.
/ s) n1 y$ l  `4 N1 R Leveraged floating rate collateralized loans – The index was trading at $90 last September, $96 in March and
4 F  h* s% N: J* z* z& a5 A! o/ M5 Dis now back to $90. Changes were a result of interest rate expectations (people thought that interest rates were
0 v5 S- m3 e( ?going up) rather than liquidity. Chapter 11 companies have no problem getting secured and when they file for
4 G- `! T  z2 Qbankruptcy, they already have debt financing in place.
8 J% R9 i' A6 \3 W8 ~+ h European banks – European bank lending conditions are tighter. This is the weakest link in the financial chain
today.
. L3 }8 E9 R5 T* ]% B% d! m7 B Emerging markets – Sovereign rates have rallied along with U.S. Treasuries. High-grade corporates in
emerging markets have no problem with funding.

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European Union agenda
% T) r9 M; w# T9 ^; J  ~) j4 N Europe is frantic and will remain so for at least another four months – which is what we see as the timeline for
the Greek default.
 As we see it, the following firewalls need to be put in place:
: g5 [% f" Q6 w# \, v+ d1. Making sure that banks have enough capital and deposit insurance to survive a Greek default
2. The European Financial Stability Facility, which is to be used for the bank capital injection and sovereign
9 |. B4 j  L8 M) N# I0 N+ Vdebt stabilization, needs government approvals.
3. Measures of assistance to help European banks to make $1.7 trillion in refinancing easier and allowing
1 T/ f  g4 Z& D' e8 y! Gbanks to shrink their balance sheets over three years
4. More fiscal reform for Spain, Italy and France is a precondition for stable sovereign debt markets.

Beyond Greece
; t4 \( W. u/ v1 H: F1 q The EFSF #2 plan announced in July was a toolkit to deal with the PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain),
# S8 N! @% _8 y: }$ {but that was before Italy.
  `* f* I' _' C It provided a $500-billion loan program, but $250 billion was already spoken for by the PIGS.
 It’s an undersized framework and if negative growth/interest rate dynamics keep investors from sponsoring the
* F! Y9 k4 U! \Italian bond market, the EU crisis will escalate further.
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8 Y' a! f: D! p7 `Conclusion
 We want to have safeguards in place and continue to be liquid, so that we can capitalize on future turbulence.

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