市场评论

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下面是九月八号Conference call 对市场评论的总结，贴出来，希望对大家有帮助。

Market Commentary
, Q1 R: y( P: P7 t- j: z* m$ x/ zEric Bushell, Chief Investment Officer
8 ~/ B. Y/ l" `. ~! A! E4 P: }James Dutkiewicz, Portfolio Manager
Signature Global Advisors
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Background remarks
. B" e* A* I. D Governments’ costs associated with stabilizing the crisis, including recent government stimulus programs, are
, {; |$ r- a& s: Das much as 20% or even 60% of GDP.
 Some governments have reached limits of sustainable debt loads and markets are beginning to insist on fiscal
6 z  G% V% Z) v0 D) ~# gadjustments.
 This marks the beginning of what will be a turbulent social and political period, where elements of the social
safety nets in Western economies are no longer affordable and must be defunded.
 Templates for fiscal adjustment are appearing in peripheral and core Europe, the U.S. and elsewhere. There are
lessons to be learned from the frontrunners.
 We see policy interventions playing a bigger role in financial markets. Policymakers are trying to ease these
9 d0 R4 F( ]$ m4 i% x' r5 Padjustments for governments and consumers as they deleverage.
 Policy interventions are shaping markets more than fundamentals. Examples include the U.S. Federal Reserve’s
  p- W* \. z& u1 F  }( C% dquantitative easing (QE2) program and the ECB intervention in the European sovereign bond market.
2 G1 G. I% F3 K9 x3 x Developed financial markets have now priced in lower levels of economic growth.
# h! {/ e# y6 P, E& W& N Credit markets are now less resilient to shocks because of Basel III and the Dodd-Frank bill. Brokers have
( _) O6 r7 _* Rreduced capacity to hold risk. Therefore, risk shedding by others is going to have a greater impact.

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Current situation
, G$ b: a: U) ^4 d The lesson we learned from the 2008-2009 credit crunch is how credit markets affect stock valuations. As long
as funding markets stay open, equities are valued as going concerns. But if credit markets close, markets may
7 H! {  M6 T+ Q% Uimpose liquidation values.
, w- U2 d9 `( H4 n  l* m In the summer, the European credit crisis caused another round of market worries about a credit shutdown. In
0 {, Q" `' @1 K  a, ]$ J. H# RAugust, we said a credit shutdown was unlikely – we continue to hold that view.
% y  G* X+ |& I+ z0 I4 o The collapse of interest rates on 10-year Treasuries to 2% leaves banks, insurance companies and pension
scrambling for higher yields to satisfy their obligations – this is supportive of corporate bond markets.

A look at credit markets
6 f# m& \# v' \4 L3 _, X/ W: ` Investment grade – $17 billion in new issues were placed last Wednesday. We’re expecting $80-$100 billion in
September. Non-financial investment grade is the new safe haven.
2 `* z2 z4 z4 C" S0 R High yield – In March, the spread above governments was 450 basis points, today it’s 740 bps. Yields were 7%
then, now they are 8.5%. New issuance has been about $30 billion a month, although August saw only $1
billion. That said, the market is still open. Risk has been repriced – but appropriately priced issues still have
access to the market. There are only two parts of the global bond market having difficulty – ultra-low-grade
CCC issues and European high yield, which are both down about 2.5% year-to-date. All other bond markets are
positive for the year-do-date, including high yield.
7 t; u0 e- @, V* @* l; I Mortgages – There is no funding for new construction, but existing quality properties are having no trouble
" [5 b& F& B& {6 afinding financing.
 Commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) – In the summer, there were two failed transactions, but they
: P# `4 {7 b# p7 F5 I/ E0 Q7 [were subsequently repriced and placed. In the fall, there will be more deals.
 Leveraged floating rate collateralized loans – The index was trading at $90 last September, $96 in March and
is now back to $90. Changes were a result of interest rate expectations (people thought that interest rates were
0 H' }" W0 }; L, d/ B, Pgoing up) rather than liquidity. Chapter 11 companies have no problem getting secured and when they file for
bankruptcy, they already have debt financing in place.
) ?& u2 ]0 }+ U  @ European banks – European bank lending conditions are tighter. This is the weakest link in the financial chain
8 E5 E8 ~+ b! v# `( G) Q% f4 C6 \5 ]today.
 Emerging markets – Sovereign rates have rallied along with U.S. Treasuries. High-grade corporates in
emerging markets have no problem with funding.

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European Union agenda
 Europe is frantic and will remain so for at least another four months – which is what we see as the timeline for
8 T- k' q) n0 U9 h6 r- Z' c1 N1 Mthe Greek default.
9 J5 O* j% o# C$ n: N7 M& p As we see it, the following firewalls need to be put in place:
1. Making sure that banks have enough capital and deposit insurance to survive a Greek default
2. The European Financial Stability Facility, which is to be used for the bank capital injection and sovereign
( X5 x4 f$ j$ ~7 y. A( s9 n& jdebt stabilization, needs government approvals.
8 J  T! \  d3 g& }& d( Y, H& s2 m3. Measures of assistance to help European banks to make $1.7 trillion in refinancing easier and allowing
) W! V, p$ C. _: P; Vbanks to shrink their balance sheets over three years
4. More fiscal reform for Spain, Italy and France is a precondition for stable sovereign debt markets.

Beyond Greece
 The EFSF #2 plan announced in July was a toolkit to deal with the PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain),
but that was before Italy.
. z# M) t/ K( a1 M, O4 \2 Z. a It provided a $500-billion loan program, but $250 billion was already spoken for by the PIGS.
4 L, s, A4 b  n* {! g) \4 ? It’s an undersized framework and if negative growth/interest rate dynamics keep investors from sponsoring the
/ b, r7 A* K, N" l/ R% O$ ]0 B( CItalian bond market, the EU crisis will escalate further.

Conclusion
* A; Q- F* o0 S3 F We want to have safeguards in place and continue to be liquid, so that we can capitalize on future turbulence.

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