市场评论

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下面是九月八号Conference call 对市场评论的总结，贴出来，希望对大家有帮助。

' }9 z8 d4 @% c) G( QMarket Commentary
5 B  H+ O2 u0 ?0 u- \Eric Bushell, Chief Investment Officer
James Dutkiewicz, Portfolio Manager
. e/ B; }# Y5 v/ N7 mSignature Global Advisors


Background remarks
. H' V1 `) A& E2 p, y8 s+ S Governments’ costs associated with stabilizing the crisis, including recent government stimulus programs, are
1 d2 t; d$ y# z. T, T3 D: fas much as 20% or even 60% of GDP.
 Some governments have reached limits of sustainable debt loads and markets are beginning to insist on fiscal
! z( s$ L6 ]. f+ ~adjustments.
 This marks the beginning of what will be a turbulent social and political period, where elements of the social
safety nets in Western economies are no longer affordable and must be defunded.
 Templates for fiscal adjustment are appearing in peripheral and core Europe, the U.S. and elsewhere. There are
lessons to be learned from the frontrunners.
* v( j# D2 m' I* |- `9 O& m+ A We see policy interventions playing a bigger role in financial markets. Policymakers are trying to ease these
% B6 s) T3 P- m6 [! Z/ Cadjustments for governments and consumers as they deleverage.
0 T3 m& T& R: X  F- ` Policy interventions are shaping markets more than fundamentals. Examples include the U.S. Federal Reserve’s
# V8 V$ d- S6 n; e9 y" ^quantitative easing (QE2) program and the ECB intervention in the European sovereign bond market.
) `6 ?+ a. y# j Developed financial markets have now priced in lower levels of economic growth.
% g% r) ~3 y0 w; z Credit markets are now less resilient to shocks because of Basel III and the Dodd-Frank bill. Brokers have
( ]) Z* P. J  J8 @- M/ Y+ H) Areduced capacity to hold risk. Therefore, risk shedding by others is going to have a greater impact.

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Current situation
 The lesson we learned from the 2008-2009 credit crunch is how credit markets affect stock valuations. As long
2 v. e# w5 e0 Z$ Q' y7 o/ `as funding markets stay open, equities are valued as going concerns. But if credit markets close, markets may
! o4 K" D: p5 z9 i, O" \impose liquidation values.
9 b+ N* h+ B2 ~ In the summer, the European credit crisis caused another round of market worries about a credit shutdown. In
/ N7 N% t/ E/ |; EAugust, we said a credit shutdown was unlikely – we continue to hold that view.
 The collapse of interest rates on 10-year Treasuries to 2% leaves banks, insurance companies and pension
5 r+ K0 W  G5 g# N3 yscrambling for higher yields to satisfy their obligations – this is supportive of corporate bond markets.

A look at credit markets
5 r2 \; h! w$ B/ |7 T1 b Investment grade – $17 billion in new issues were placed last Wednesday. We’re expecting $80-$100 billion in
September. Non-financial investment grade is the new safe haven.
 High yield – In March, the spread above governments was 450 basis points, today it’s 740 bps. Yields were 7%
then, now they are 8.5%. New issuance has been about $30 billion a month, although August saw only $1
# j2 ^% S: d/ t3 d# x( pbillion. That said, the market is still open. Risk has been repriced – but appropriately priced issues still have
" M1 U* T" l: d3 T) \6 [- Jaccess to the market. There are only two parts of the global bond market having difficulty – ultra-low-grade
' Z) Q) w& Y1 d, _$ c8 `CCC issues and European high yield, which are both down about 2.5% year-to-date. All other bond markets are
positive for the year-do-date, including high yield.
 Mortgages – There is no funding for new construction, but existing quality properties are having no trouble
finding financing.
$ v4 ~# m: ^; S7 ] Commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) – In the summer, there were two failed transactions, but they
were subsequently repriced and placed. In the fall, there will be more deals.
5 b7 n. q* @5 T+ ^ Leveraged floating rate collateralized loans – The index was trading at $90 last September, $96 in March and
is now back to $90. Changes were a result of interest rate expectations (people thought that interest rates were
going up) rather than liquidity. Chapter 11 companies have no problem getting secured and when they file for
8 X3 e" `. b% ~& w  Sbankruptcy, they already have debt financing in place.
 European banks – European bank lending conditions are tighter. This is the weakest link in the financial chain
$ E$ b/ |( `& \$ ~+ Qtoday.
$ e$ r8 c$ J4 _% c5 F Emerging markets – Sovereign rates have rallied along with U.S. Treasuries. High-grade corporates in
emerging markets have no problem with funding.

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European Union agenda
2 O; B+ {% m8 ]& x4 ^ Europe is frantic and will remain so for at least another four months – which is what we see as the timeline for
! o' f! Z0 |& {the Greek default.
 As we see it, the following firewalls need to be put in place:
1. Making sure that banks have enough capital and deposit insurance to survive a Greek default
6 N6 j# E1 l4 g6 f4 r2. The European Financial Stability Facility, which is to be used for the bank capital injection and sovereign
1 {9 v) l0 {0 B8 L" c4 J& M/ Gdebt stabilization, needs government approvals.
) T( r  L$ J# H1 j* s3. Measures of assistance to help European banks to make $1.7 trillion in refinancing easier and allowing
banks to shrink their balance sheets over three years
4. More fiscal reform for Spain, Italy and France is a precondition for stable sovereign debt markets.

) G1 q5 Y( |' W) M% CBeyond Greece
 The EFSF #2 plan announced in July was a toolkit to deal with the PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain),
but that was before Italy.
8 m1 ~2 F6 m) K" P/ v; G! g4 _ It provided a $500-billion loan program, but $250 billion was already spoken for by the PIGS.
 It’s an undersized framework and if negative growth/interest rate dynamics keep investors from sponsoring the
Italian bond market, the EU crisis will escalate further.

Conclusion
 We want to have safeguards in place and continue to be liquid, so that we can capitalize on future turbulence.

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