市场评论

小曲

下面是九月八号Conference call 对市场评论的总结，贴出来，希望对大家有帮助。

Market Commentary
2 a3 C- ~0 B$ Q* y. ]- qEric Bushell, Chief Investment Officer
James Dutkiewicz, Portfolio Manager
3 s3 O' e, L$ z* Z! V0 \, k+ jSignature Global Advisors


2 Q/ W2 c0 b3 f* {' u( Q8 y. @. X$ iBackground remarks
 Governments’ costs associated with stabilizing the crisis, including recent government stimulus programs, are
, y0 D3 r; w" D. w( U$ pas much as 20% or even 60% of GDP.
 Some governments have reached limits of sustainable debt loads and markets are beginning to insist on fiscal
+ e4 S8 I% o+ v% e3 |+ Y% c  j& badjustments.
 This marks the beginning of what will be a turbulent social and political period, where elements of the social
safety nets in Western economies are no longer affordable and must be defunded.
2 v. A$ j; s# X3 [' U/ W Templates for fiscal adjustment are appearing in peripheral and core Europe, the U.S. and elsewhere. There are
) @9 D; _7 {" W4 [- olessons to be learned from the frontrunners.
 We see policy interventions playing a bigger role in financial markets. Policymakers are trying to ease these
$ H( V0 S9 O; F9 Oadjustments for governments and consumers as they deleverage.
" U2 w: D  q/ _$ Z0 i Policy interventions are shaping markets more than fundamentals. Examples include the U.S. Federal Reserve’s
quantitative easing (QE2) program and the ECB intervention in the European sovereign bond market.
/ t9 G: x" O! k3 t  Z; c Developed financial markets have now priced in lower levels of economic growth.
7 k) D; p3 r0 k" I1 ^/ V1 J0 } Credit markets are now less resilient to shocks because of Basel III and the Dodd-Frank bill. Brokers have
reduced capacity to hold risk. Therefore, risk shedding by others is going to have a greater impact.

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Current situation
" j7 O7 V- J- _! A' [& s The lesson we learned from the 2008-2009 credit crunch is how credit markets affect stock valuations. As long
as funding markets stay open, equities are valued as going concerns. But if credit markets close, markets may
" A$ |8 r1 \2 n% V( nimpose liquidation values.
1 m  P9 h7 t; j In the summer, the European credit crisis caused another round of market worries about a credit shutdown. In
4 X* b. ?4 x  U* [August, we said a credit shutdown was unlikely – we continue to hold that view.
 The collapse of interest rates on 10-year Treasuries to 2% leaves banks, insurance companies and pension
. j* i: Q, ~7 U) }/ hscrambling for higher yields to satisfy their obligations – this is supportive of corporate bond markets.

, x' z0 R% \" e; C8 pA look at credit markets
 Investment grade – $17 billion in new issues were placed last Wednesday. We’re expecting $80-$100 billion in
September. Non-financial investment grade is the new safe haven.
$ r7 a( F4 }: p3 R4 k High yield – In March, the spread above governments was 450 basis points, today it’s 740 bps. Yields were 7%
then, now they are 8.5%. New issuance has been about $30 billion a month, although August saw only $1
8 ?$ r6 _. l" \8 G8 Gbillion. That said, the market is still open. Risk has been repriced – but appropriately priced issues still have
access to the market. There are only two parts of the global bond market having difficulty – ultra-low-grade
CCC issues and European high yield, which are both down about 2.5% year-to-date. All other bond markets are
* @: H' t* F0 u& k' h# |$ \positive for the year-do-date, including high yield.
; N' w' z, Q+ `1 x) Q Mortgages – There is no funding for new construction, but existing quality properties are having no trouble
finding financing.
 Commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) – In the summer, there were two failed transactions, but they
were subsequently repriced and placed. In the fall, there will be more deals.
) A4 }' O3 T$ T# e) {6 [ Leveraged floating rate collateralized loans – The index was trading at $90 last September, $96 in March and
* C2 k9 r' r, r( f, Pis now back to $90. Changes were a result of interest rate expectations (people thought that interest rates were
going up) rather than liquidity. Chapter 11 companies have no problem getting secured and when they file for
- L7 [4 K5 A4 `4 L* cbankruptcy, they already have debt financing in place.
8 ]) K  k' }+ q5 i European banks – European bank lending conditions are tighter. This is the weakest link in the financial chain
4 N! l4 R' A: i  Stoday.
 Emerging markets – Sovereign rates have rallied along with U.S. Treasuries. High-grade corporates in
! A, S) s# N+ e1 K* ]" }emerging markets have no problem with funding.

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European Union agenda
 Europe is frantic and will remain so for at least another four months – which is what we see as the timeline for
the Greek default.
 As we see it, the following firewalls need to be put in place:
; A8 W2 l0 j: ~* i0 M, }2 U/ F1. Making sure that banks have enough capital and deposit insurance to survive a Greek default
2. The European Financial Stability Facility, which is to be used for the bank capital injection and sovereign
5 d$ d% W, N# I! x$ ndebt stabilization, needs government approvals.
3. Measures of assistance to help European banks to make $1.7 trillion in refinancing easier and allowing
0 \6 `# }+ r6 O0 w2 bbanks to shrink their balance sheets over three years
4. More fiscal reform for Spain, Italy and France is a precondition for stable sovereign debt markets.

Beyond Greece
9 r3 C. ~2 n& ]; E* G' D3 ? The EFSF #2 plan announced in July was a toolkit to deal with the PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain),
& r+ ]" g# R8 M* o  }but that was before Italy.
 It provided a $500-billion loan program, but $250 billion was already spoken for by the PIGS.
 It’s an undersized framework and if negative growth/interest rate dynamics keep investors from sponsoring the
Italian bond market, the EU crisis will escalate further.
6 z! C; e  c2 e* F& i
; ]1 A! Z* s, g+ P* tConclusion
 We want to have safeguards in place and continue to be liquid, so that we can capitalize on future turbulence.

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