市场评论

小曲

下面是九月八号Conference call 对市场评论的总结，贴出来，希望对大家有帮助。
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Market Commentary
) s- q5 N9 O) ~6 D6 R. ?Eric Bushell, Chief Investment Officer
James Dutkiewicz, Portfolio Manager
Signature Global Advisors
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Background remarks
5 f7 u8 [$ F. i$ `% ? Governments’ costs associated with stabilizing the crisis, including recent government stimulus programs, are
% N# g9 ^$ L7 F2 Y. {( r9 l: fas much as 20% or even 60% of GDP.
 Some governments have reached limits of sustainable debt loads and markets are beginning to insist on fiscal
, @9 r7 v1 K$ N+ ?$ yadjustments.
 This marks the beginning of what will be a turbulent social and political period, where elements of the social
+ |' t$ G& ~6 J# t* R' vsafety nets in Western economies are no longer affordable and must be defunded.
, I' T4 r. z  V& m) C7 f( u Templates for fiscal adjustment are appearing in peripheral and core Europe, the U.S. and elsewhere. There are
" U0 M( x* b* v. B! g) b" Ylessons to be learned from the frontrunners.
 We see policy interventions playing a bigger role in financial markets. Policymakers are trying to ease these
adjustments for governments and consumers as they deleverage.
 Policy interventions are shaping markets more than fundamentals. Examples include the U.S. Federal Reserve’s
quantitative easing (QE2) program and the ECB intervention in the European sovereign bond market.
 Developed financial markets have now priced in lower levels of economic growth.
3 m% Z9 n, l1 i9 O) ]2 ~0 } Credit markets are now less resilient to shocks because of Basel III and the Dodd-Frank bill. Brokers have
reduced capacity to hold risk. Therefore, risk shedding by others is going to have a greater impact.

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Current situation
- Z) K  L( n2 A# M% |2 i The lesson we learned from the 2008-2009 credit crunch is how credit markets affect stock valuations. As long
0 p' r" V  O  z6 ^& B# Las funding markets stay open, equities are valued as going concerns. But if credit markets close, markets may
impose liquidation values.
5 m3 Q) J+ i9 B: ^6 _# q In the summer, the European credit crisis caused another round of market worries about a credit shutdown. In
# W. j- K) P7 P  _August, we said a credit shutdown was unlikely – we continue to hold that view.
! ]* V2 K4 H- }, n% |8 B9 B. U7 x+ o The collapse of interest rates on 10-year Treasuries to 2% leaves banks, insurance companies and pension
  Y8 t  N" k* {1 S8 q2 D- gscrambling for higher yields to satisfy their obligations – this is supportive of corporate bond markets.

3 k% W2 Q4 f0 T6 w. D  [- XA look at credit markets
) A0 B& ~0 V1 n, S' g1 {) b Investment grade – $17 billion in new issues were placed last Wednesday. We’re expecting $80-$100 billion in
* c1 C" B4 i7 U6 s" n  hSeptember. Non-financial investment grade is the new safe haven.
 High yield – In March, the spread above governments was 450 basis points, today it’s 740 bps. Yields were 7%
then, now they are 8.5%. New issuance has been about $30 billion a month, although August saw only $1
8 W; h1 i% [: Q& H' j% Cbillion. That said, the market is still open. Risk has been repriced – but appropriately priced issues still have
access to the market. There are only two parts of the global bond market having difficulty – ultra-low-grade
CCC issues and European high yield, which are both down about 2.5% year-to-date. All other bond markets are
positive for the year-do-date, including high yield.
 Mortgages – There is no funding for new construction, but existing quality properties are having no trouble
6 c3 R# y$ e6 Efinding financing.
 Commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) – In the summer, there were two failed transactions, but they
# \' ~9 m/ `# m, Y! U( Fwere subsequently repriced and placed. In the fall, there will be more deals.
  F  b) F/ M  L5 Z) z% f# \ Leveraged floating rate collateralized loans – The index was trading at $90 last September, $96 in March and
is now back to $90. Changes were a result of interest rate expectations (people thought that interest rates were
2 x5 H$ \. Q0 M+ l2 h  n# |going up) rather than liquidity. Chapter 11 companies have no problem getting secured and when they file for
bankruptcy, they already have debt financing in place.
5 z% Z0 K9 E8 x European banks – European bank lending conditions are tighter. This is the weakest link in the financial chain
+ C1 C2 e; n0 o) y. j/ xtoday.
 Emerging markets – Sovereign rates have rallied along with U.S. Treasuries. High-grade corporates in
emerging markets have no problem with funding.

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European Union agenda
 Europe is frantic and will remain so for at least another four months – which is what we see as the timeline for
  Y; }; X; T- m! _6 Q7 }the Greek default.
 As we see it, the following firewalls need to be put in place:
1. Making sure that banks have enough capital and deposit insurance to survive a Greek default
2. The European Financial Stability Facility, which is to be used for the bank capital injection and sovereign
* @% p# V6 f6 [. m' u# b( U% ?debt stabilization, needs government approvals.
3. Measures of assistance to help European banks to make $1.7 trillion in refinancing easier and allowing
banks to shrink their balance sheets over three years
4. More fiscal reform for Spain, Italy and France is a precondition for stable sovereign debt markets.
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Beyond Greece
 The EFSF #2 plan announced in July was a toolkit to deal with the PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain),
* Z  e! l1 n2 @but that was before Italy.
. W+ w2 k8 |& A; R8 L6 V% q It provided a $500-billion loan program, but $250 billion was already spoken for by the PIGS.
 It’s an undersized framework and if negative growth/interest rate dynamics keep investors from sponsoring the
Italian bond market, the EU crisis will escalate further.
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* {9 m5 x& W+ F3 s7 m9 l8 \2 _Conclusion
) S1 Y& O+ k( { We want to have safeguards in place and continue to be liquid, so that we can capitalize on future turbulence.

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