市场评论

小曲

下面是九月八号Conference call 对市场评论的总结，贴出来，希望对大家有帮助。
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8 o  D- ^$ r- l! G1 u3 j0 bMarket Commentary
Eric Bushell, Chief Investment Officer
$ R& c  q9 _4 |% P. XJames Dutkiewicz, Portfolio Manager
, `5 Y9 z, ~3 q9 _+ ~3 V7 W" Z& eSignature Global Advisors
& W# t; S& F5 `( m! s. ]& g

Background remarks
/ n/ X& \: T  l. b% a7 Y Governments’ costs associated with stabilizing the crisis, including recent government stimulus programs, are
' X/ X6 C: A& _. V! `as much as 20% or even 60% of GDP.
 Some governments have reached limits of sustainable debt loads and markets are beginning to insist on fiscal
adjustments.
 This marks the beginning of what will be a turbulent social and political period, where elements of the social
safety nets in Western economies are no longer affordable and must be defunded.
 Templates for fiscal adjustment are appearing in peripheral and core Europe, the U.S. and elsewhere. There are
+ P1 K, L' V! E& m6 flessons to be learned from the frontrunners.
+ ]/ ~0 P, y6 J1 t. H# ?3 f! z We see policy interventions playing a bigger role in financial markets. Policymakers are trying to ease these
adjustments for governments and consumers as they deleverage.
 Policy interventions are shaping markets more than fundamentals. Examples include the U.S. Federal Reserve’s
" ~7 n4 U  k3 S. q& @; y; B- pquantitative easing (QE2) program and the ECB intervention in the European sovereign bond market.
8 [3 |9 ?0 k' S' W0 ]6 \ Developed financial markets have now priced in lower levels of economic growth.
 Credit markets are now less resilient to shocks because of Basel III and the Dodd-Frank bill. Brokers have
+ V8 U/ j* ]4 r: T6 j9 S' j) oreduced capacity to hold risk. Therefore, risk shedding by others is going to have a greater impact.

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Current situation
 The lesson we learned from the 2008-2009 credit crunch is how credit markets affect stock valuations. As long
' @: \* n' h  @as funding markets stay open, equities are valued as going concerns. But if credit markets close, markets may
0 w" o, O' J6 b  o' }" Y& dimpose liquidation values.
 In the summer, the European credit crisis caused another round of market worries about a credit shutdown. In
August, we said a credit shutdown was unlikely – we continue to hold that view.
( O; _$ @4 k2 m) _7 { The collapse of interest rates on 10-year Treasuries to 2% leaves banks, insurance companies and pension
scrambling for higher yields to satisfy their obligations – this is supportive of corporate bond markets.
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A look at credit markets
 Investment grade – $17 billion in new issues were placed last Wednesday. We’re expecting $80-$100 billion in
September. Non-financial investment grade is the new safe haven.
8 y# p- G3 m. J, f High yield – In March, the spread above governments was 450 basis points, today it’s 740 bps. Yields were 7%
then, now they are 8.5%. New issuance has been about $30 billion a month, although August saw only $1
billion. That said, the market is still open. Risk has been repriced – but appropriately priced issues still have
access to the market. There are only two parts of the global bond market having difficulty – ultra-low-grade
CCC issues and European high yield, which are both down about 2.5% year-to-date. All other bond markets are
positive for the year-do-date, including high yield.
 Mortgages – There is no funding for new construction, but existing quality properties are having no trouble
; J) k& }& L5 ^- }& ]finding financing.
: P! Y& W' i+ x1 ?( B' K8 _$ L. t Commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) – In the summer, there were two failed transactions, but they
were subsequently repriced and placed. In the fall, there will be more deals.
 Leveraged floating rate collateralized loans – The index was trading at $90 last September, $96 in March and
is now back to $90. Changes were a result of interest rate expectations (people thought that interest rates were
6 z0 \7 }# V. Wgoing up) rather than liquidity. Chapter 11 companies have no problem getting secured and when they file for
" N: E4 a% B; x- w) S$ n- N4 xbankruptcy, they already have debt financing in place.
, t2 b8 m! x! p9 u: ~ European banks – European bank lending conditions are tighter. This is the weakest link in the financial chain
today.
 Emerging markets – Sovereign rates have rallied along with U.S. Treasuries. High-grade corporates in
emerging markets have no problem with funding.

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European Union agenda
 Europe is frantic and will remain so for at least another four months – which is what we see as the timeline for
the Greek default.
) S. C% v' m) Y8 q" B As we see it, the following firewalls need to be put in place:
9 S8 [2 z0 V. |* C) s1. Making sure that banks have enough capital and deposit insurance to survive a Greek default
* T1 f5 {7 @6 R7 y% W/ b+ @2. The European Financial Stability Facility, which is to be used for the bank capital injection and sovereign
% Q# |9 w+ h$ a, H4 qdebt stabilization, needs government approvals.
) ?' \, E. V1 x8 B* Z# B) v) A3. Measures of assistance to help European banks to make $1.7 trillion in refinancing easier and allowing
) Y' }8 j1 d  p9 t5 N% ebanks to shrink their balance sheets over three years
4. More fiscal reform for Spain, Italy and France is a precondition for stable sovereign debt markets.
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Beyond Greece
 The EFSF #2 plan announced in July was a toolkit to deal with the PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain),
but that was before Italy.
 It provided a $500-billion loan program, but $250 billion was already spoken for by the PIGS.
! v: y- C' \4 U6 d3 J It’s an undersized framework and if negative growth/interest rate dynamics keep investors from sponsoring the
7 G2 R5 W/ [# @+ `, O! X3 J9 rItalian bond market, the EU crisis will escalate further.
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7 L) u( ]2 s7 v2 }" b0 r) oConclusion
5 T# s1 {- f+ v# Y% d2 t1 z9 J We want to have safeguards in place and continue to be liquid, so that we can capitalize on future turbulence.

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