市场评论

小曲

下面是九月八号Conference call 对市场评论的总结，贴出来，希望对大家有帮助。

  E8 C' j% l  ^" E/ ]2 `/ }# ^, uMarket Commentary
9 T. Q/ q8 ?5 {: o9 g- REric Bushell, Chief Investment Officer
James Dutkiewicz, Portfolio Manager
Signature Global Advisors
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Background remarks
 Governments’ costs associated with stabilizing the crisis, including recent government stimulus programs, are
# N: S) n9 E3 mas much as 20% or even 60% of GDP.
 Some governments have reached limits of sustainable debt loads and markets are beginning to insist on fiscal
adjustments.
5 [" m0 e7 h. ?4 b, w This marks the beginning of what will be a turbulent social and political period, where elements of the social
safety nets in Western economies are no longer affordable and must be defunded.
 Templates for fiscal adjustment are appearing in peripheral and core Europe, the U.S. and elsewhere. There are
lessons to be learned from the frontrunners.
 We see policy interventions playing a bigger role in financial markets. Policymakers are trying to ease these
+ l  Q+ b5 z2 [. F- U/ ^+ tadjustments for governments and consumers as they deleverage.
 Policy interventions are shaping markets more than fundamentals. Examples include the U.S. Federal Reserve’s
! R! x5 g" K; s5 `& k6 x7 F. hquantitative easing (QE2) program and the ECB intervention in the European sovereign bond market.
 Developed financial markets have now priced in lower levels of economic growth.
/ u  m4 W  X5 O6 T; D( y Credit markets are now less resilient to shocks because of Basel III and the Dodd-Frank bill. Brokers have
reduced capacity to hold risk. Therefore, risk shedding by others is going to have a greater impact.

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Current situation
 The lesson we learned from the 2008-2009 credit crunch is how credit markets affect stock valuations. As long
as funding markets stay open, equities are valued as going concerns. But if credit markets close, markets may
6 ^8 `* c* f4 |9 H4 B* Q% s2 zimpose liquidation values.
. Z3 a# [. m- s In the summer, the European credit crisis caused another round of market worries about a credit shutdown. In
August, we said a credit shutdown was unlikely – we continue to hold that view.
 The collapse of interest rates on 10-year Treasuries to 2% leaves banks, insurance companies and pension
scrambling for higher yields to satisfy their obligations – this is supportive of corporate bond markets.
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* E$ [% `4 V0 x3 X: |5 G  ~/ B3 mA look at credit markets
4 |( l  ~; Y1 O1 M( H; } Investment grade – $17 billion in new issues were placed last Wednesday. We’re expecting $80-$100 billion in
1 y% E6 h; V2 s) c9 U/ Y  zSeptember. Non-financial investment grade is the new safe haven.
7 S8 \  j( `6 I High yield – In March, the spread above governments was 450 basis points, today it’s 740 bps. Yields were 7%
4 q! h' H# n, I1 P1 M5 Y% F5 P0 a6 athen, now they are 8.5%. New issuance has been about $30 billion a month, although August saw only $1
; s, `6 n6 x0 h( j4 Y! J5 Z4 p2 nbillion. That said, the market is still open. Risk has been repriced – but appropriately priced issues still have
access to the market. There are only two parts of the global bond market having difficulty – ultra-low-grade
CCC issues and European high yield, which are both down about 2.5% year-to-date. All other bond markets are
positive for the year-do-date, including high yield.
) U- I: C9 s9 I! J) c$ S Mortgages – There is no funding for new construction, but existing quality properties are having no trouble
% |" X% c( \+ h$ E" ifinding financing.
 Commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) – In the summer, there were two failed transactions, but they
6 }; y# Q) ~8 G! i, iwere subsequently repriced and placed. In the fall, there will be more deals.
 Leveraged floating rate collateralized loans – The index was trading at $90 last September, $96 in March and
is now back to $90. Changes were a result of interest rate expectations (people thought that interest rates were
: Y, k$ k+ m5 e9 F5 B; ^going up) rather than liquidity. Chapter 11 companies have no problem getting secured and when they file for
/ i2 ~1 T! Z: Gbankruptcy, they already have debt financing in place.
 European banks – European bank lending conditions are tighter. This is the weakest link in the financial chain
today.
8 d, U+ s* |% M# A+ ?- c Emerging markets – Sovereign rates have rallied along with U.S. Treasuries. High-grade corporates in
emerging markets have no problem with funding.

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European Union agenda
( p7 ]1 K4 E$ ]! t/ ], T/ [0 M/ x Europe is frantic and will remain so for at least another four months – which is what we see as the timeline for
* D  m$ m" x0 d* _3 ~/ F) {2 \the Greek default.
+ l  s* l, y& N1 t/ N3 f0 C& ? As we see it, the following firewalls need to be put in place:
1. Making sure that banks have enough capital and deposit insurance to survive a Greek default
  v9 K; F* G. K5 x0 D7 d2. The European Financial Stability Facility, which is to be used for the bank capital injection and sovereign
debt stabilization, needs government approvals.
- u) K: S+ d1 j3. Measures of assistance to help European banks to make $1.7 trillion in refinancing easier and allowing
1 p1 ]0 Z9 D0 l8 w9 Fbanks to shrink their balance sheets over three years
5 E+ V3 k$ A2 {4. More fiscal reform for Spain, Italy and France is a precondition for stable sovereign debt markets.

6 ^: s# x: `: |Beyond Greece
 The EFSF #2 plan announced in July was a toolkit to deal with the PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain),
) P+ v" Z/ ~% v+ p; ybut that was before Italy.
/ F- p; d, M& R9 [- v It provided a $500-billion loan program, but $250 billion was already spoken for by the PIGS.
 It’s an undersized framework and if negative growth/interest rate dynamics keep investors from sponsoring the
+ y* D$ K4 g) \9 Q' z  \Italian bond market, the EU crisis will escalate further.

Conclusion
8 H7 t- B5 p( b5 t& A7 [4 c We want to have safeguards in place and continue to be liquid, so that we can capitalize on future turbulence.

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