市场评论

小曲

下面是九月八号Conference call 对市场评论的总结，贴出来，希望对大家有帮助。

4 h6 N5 w  Z( {8 q9 M/ q  BMarket Commentary
Eric Bushell, Chief Investment Officer
  U0 |) E  a0 {3 y8 [James Dutkiewicz, Portfolio Manager
3 r0 @4 u! {* l8 k$ _# jSignature Global Advisors
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6 T7 A' T+ a; y" tBackground remarks
 Governments’ costs associated with stabilizing the crisis, including recent government stimulus programs, are
2 A2 @  K9 N& eas much as 20% or even 60% of GDP.
 Some governments have reached limits of sustainable debt loads and markets are beginning to insist on fiscal
adjustments.
* y, Q3 g0 E+ c# V This marks the beginning of what will be a turbulent social and political period, where elements of the social
safety nets in Western economies are no longer affordable and must be defunded.
 Templates for fiscal adjustment are appearing in peripheral and core Europe, the U.S. and elsewhere. There are
lessons to be learned from the frontrunners.
 We see policy interventions playing a bigger role in financial markets. Policymakers are trying to ease these
adjustments for governments and consumers as they deleverage.
9 p( \& @; S2 Q! |* z7 C4 k Policy interventions are shaping markets more than fundamentals. Examples include the U.S. Federal Reserve’s
quantitative easing (QE2) program and the ECB intervention in the European sovereign bond market.
% A6 l2 _- j9 Y  `& R. B Developed financial markets have now priced in lower levels of economic growth.
( v2 i! J  s. c+ S. ^0 D$ q Credit markets are now less resilient to shocks because of Basel III and the Dodd-Frank bill. Brokers have
+ P8 V$ _- }' L7 e! K! X5 ~reduced capacity to hold risk. Therefore, risk shedding by others is going to have a greater impact.

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Current situation
 The lesson we learned from the 2008-2009 credit crunch is how credit markets affect stock valuations. As long
as funding markets stay open, equities are valued as going concerns. But if credit markets close, markets may
) X; }; _: Y8 i0 `impose liquidation values.
 In the summer, the European credit crisis caused another round of market worries about a credit shutdown. In
August, we said a credit shutdown was unlikely – we continue to hold that view.
7 t8 j- A6 r7 U% m7 G0 [% i: G The collapse of interest rates on 10-year Treasuries to 2% leaves banks, insurance companies and pension
& ~5 k5 y- H0 yscrambling for higher yields to satisfy their obligations – this is supportive of corporate bond markets.
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1 y% k7 w" I" J& x8 IA look at credit markets
' P4 V' U" \) \. B  O7 l' ? Investment grade – $17 billion in new issues were placed last Wednesday. We’re expecting $80-$100 billion in
; l/ ~" \9 s: c; ESeptember. Non-financial investment grade is the new safe haven.
. |6 S/ U: _) o( b9 S/ l# { High yield – In March, the spread above governments was 450 basis points, today it’s 740 bps. Yields were 7%
then, now they are 8.5%. New issuance has been about $30 billion a month, although August saw only $1
billion. That said, the market is still open. Risk has been repriced – but appropriately priced issues still have
access to the market. There are only two parts of the global bond market having difficulty – ultra-low-grade
: }9 Q& f9 ^& p, n0 m) ACCC issues and European high yield, which are both down about 2.5% year-to-date. All other bond markets are
9 F; U3 Y! S: A  K) |positive for the year-do-date, including high yield.
 Mortgages – There is no funding for new construction, but existing quality properties are having no trouble
finding financing.
 Commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) – In the summer, there were two failed transactions, but they
6 P3 O7 N% r* Q8 {: iwere subsequently repriced and placed. In the fall, there will be more deals.
) j  o( }* E5 F% P, [ Leveraged floating rate collateralized loans – The index was trading at $90 last September, $96 in March and
6 b5 H# z' I8 S( u  ~- s5 Ois now back to $90. Changes were a result of interest rate expectations (people thought that interest rates were
' Z1 Q/ ^) C; [, igoing up) rather than liquidity. Chapter 11 companies have no problem getting secured and when they file for
, D* E: W. r, T) G, Rbankruptcy, they already have debt financing in place.
  Q/ G1 Z, ~" I5 W6 p9 o2 r European banks – European bank lending conditions are tighter. This is the weakest link in the financial chain
today.
 Emerging markets – Sovereign rates have rallied along with U.S. Treasuries. High-grade corporates in
emerging markets have no problem with funding.

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European Union agenda
/ T  S* C! V  _. h5 k0 B# E7 ~ Europe is frantic and will remain so for at least another four months – which is what we see as the timeline for
. o4 P0 e5 U( `the Greek default.
 As we see it, the following firewalls need to be put in place:
1. Making sure that banks have enough capital and deposit insurance to survive a Greek default
6 E, r9 S8 R  x: Y) ^3 N1 @2. The European Financial Stability Facility, which is to be used for the bank capital injection and sovereign
' x1 P1 H+ U! v3 I' Ldebt stabilization, needs government approvals.
5 s+ T% j+ P4 {. r3. Measures of assistance to help European banks to make $1.7 trillion in refinancing easier and allowing
banks to shrink their balance sheets over three years
: R  }& G! O# c  G. L4. More fiscal reform for Spain, Italy and France is a precondition for stable sovereign debt markets.

Beyond Greece
5 [6 B- Y7 ?, P- R2 B, a/ S+ W The EFSF #2 plan announced in July was a toolkit to deal with the PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain),
but that was before Italy.
( g4 _5 ]/ U1 @! B! Z It provided a $500-billion loan program, but $250 billion was already spoken for by the PIGS.
1 r2 i. N0 z# _% W It’s an undersized framework and if negative growth/interest rate dynamics keep investors from sponsoring the
) L) Q+ k6 L+ }- O- A; V$ T6 ]Italian bond market, the EU crisis will escalate further.
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+ r$ Q- a% G* y; z5 cConclusion
 We want to have safeguards in place and continue to be liquid, so that we can capitalize on future turbulence.

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