市场评论

小曲

下面是九月八号Conference call 对市场评论的总结，贴出来，希望对大家有帮助。
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2 g8 z- O" g/ J2 zMarket Commentary
1 k" y/ }- u* e- O1 U4 U' v/ }! `Eric Bushell, Chief Investment Officer
0 c% X* H5 h# ^3 NJames Dutkiewicz, Portfolio Manager
1 x6 ?, W7 I+ q& Z' m3 Y% VSignature Global Advisors
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. B  G. j" j* _  Q$ a* LBackground remarks
 Governments’ costs associated with stabilizing the crisis, including recent government stimulus programs, are
as much as 20% or even 60% of GDP.
& U  c4 b: }) v8 v# I, h Some governments have reached limits of sustainable debt loads and markets are beginning to insist on fiscal
adjustments.
 This marks the beginning of what will be a turbulent social and political period, where elements of the social
- }  D, q$ b4 O4 n: N/ Jsafety nets in Western economies are no longer affordable and must be defunded.
 Templates for fiscal adjustment are appearing in peripheral and core Europe, the U.S. and elsewhere. There are
2 ~* \) W! Z  `4 D9 Q% blessons to be learned from the frontrunners.
 We see policy interventions playing a bigger role in financial markets. Policymakers are trying to ease these
adjustments for governments and consumers as they deleverage.
 Policy interventions are shaping markets more than fundamentals. Examples include the U.S. Federal Reserve’s
quantitative easing (QE2) program and the ECB intervention in the European sovereign bond market.
 Developed financial markets have now priced in lower levels of economic growth.
$ C' A3 ~/ a+ \; S. R% a Credit markets are now less resilient to shocks because of Basel III and the Dodd-Frank bill. Brokers have
( i, w+ ?1 U, Z+ o9 p8 ?* Vreduced capacity to hold risk. Therefore, risk shedding by others is going to have a greater impact.

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Current situation
 The lesson we learned from the 2008-2009 credit crunch is how credit markets affect stock valuations. As long
9 E. n9 k2 `) i5 p) ?( sas funding markets stay open, equities are valued as going concerns. But if credit markets close, markets may
impose liquidation values.
9 m+ q; o" z# O: m6 ] In the summer, the European credit crisis caused another round of market worries about a credit shutdown. In
3 o4 _. H: [% M3 i4 dAugust, we said a credit shutdown was unlikely – we continue to hold that view.
 The collapse of interest rates on 10-year Treasuries to 2% leaves banks, insurance companies and pension
scrambling for higher yields to satisfy their obligations – this is supportive of corporate bond markets.
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A look at credit markets
, T1 U4 M+ ]9 H Investment grade – $17 billion in new issues were placed last Wednesday. We’re expecting $80-$100 billion in
! S+ F( Z' p0 r! n: U; h, _September. Non-financial investment grade is the new safe haven.
9 g% @  \' T4 S/ o High yield – In March, the spread above governments was 450 basis points, today it’s 740 bps. Yields were 7%
then, now they are 8.5%. New issuance has been about $30 billion a month, although August saw only $1
4 r) G; K/ e' P! u" q5 Ybillion. That said, the market is still open. Risk has been repriced – but appropriately priced issues still have
4 }2 r- \. \- y% Q$ w3 F3 Aaccess to the market. There are only two parts of the global bond market having difficulty – ultra-low-grade
CCC issues and European high yield, which are both down about 2.5% year-to-date. All other bond markets are
0 G5 I7 s, n+ K" C& O* ]positive for the year-do-date, including high yield.
 Mortgages – There is no funding for new construction, but existing quality properties are having no trouble
finding financing.
 Commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) – In the summer, there were two failed transactions, but they
were subsequently repriced and placed. In the fall, there will be more deals.
 Leveraged floating rate collateralized loans – The index was trading at $90 last September, $96 in March and
. s7 ]) a* I2 C# c% vis now back to $90. Changes were a result of interest rate expectations (people thought that interest rates were
3 J9 k& {! V& q, g- Kgoing up) rather than liquidity. Chapter 11 companies have no problem getting secured and when they file for
# k- p$ k6 Z3 L. P5 q) d$ Jbankruptcy, they already have debt financing in place.
 European banks – European bank lending conditions are tighter. This is the weakest link in the financial chain
3 Z+ v( ?) ]4 b2 s6 S3 I- s; Utoday.
' s) P: H3 |7 }0 ~  w" U! [6 L Emerging markets – Sovereign rates have rallied along with U.S. Treasuries. High-grade corporates in
emerging markets have no problem with funding.

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European Union agenda
6 a" c6 J3 l* u) r Europe is frantic and will remain so for at least another four months – which is what we see as the timeline for
the Greek default.
 As we see it, the following firewalls need to be put in place:
2 r6 o1 _! f( P4 n+ ?- T- C# H1. Making sure that banks have enough capital and deposit insurance to survive a Greek default
2. The European Financial Stability Facility, which is to be used for the bank capital injection and sovereign
debt stabilization, needs government approvals.
+ ^' |) [9 J/ c+ v$ Y1 w3. Measures of assistance to help European banks to make $1.7 trillion in refinancing easier and allowing
) R$ S& l; ?& n- w& d; ubanks to shrink their balance sheets over three years
4. More fiscal reform for Spain, Italy and France is a precondition for stable sovereign debt markets.

1 Z9 p' n4 A8 n4 MBeyond Greece
, _! Z$ n9 i2 n: v$ p+ j5 x/ ? The EFSF #2 plan announced in July was a toolkit to deal with the PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain),
but that was before Italy.
2 }' D8 V3 f4 e It provided a $500-billion loan program, but $250 billion was already spoken for by the PIGS.
 It’s an undersized framework and if negative growth/interest rate dynamics keep investors from sponsoring the
5 L6 D1 M5 d/ Z3 E; rItalian bond market, the EU crisis will escalate further.
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Conclusion
& o+ N% D9 \% Y We want to have safeguards in place and continue to be liquid, so that we can capitalize on future turbulence.

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