市场评论

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下面是九月八号Conference call 对市场评论的总结，贴出来，希望对大家有帮助。
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Market Commentary
4 u8 w( C( U* u  I" TEric Bushell, Chief Investment Officer
James Dutkiewicz, Portfolio Manager
Signature Global Advisors


Background remarks
 Governments’ costs associated with stabilizing the crisis, including recent government stimulus programs, are
as much as 20% or even 60% of GDP.
$ I9 Y) p( s' i Some governments have reached limits of sustainable debt loads and markets are beginning to insist on fiscal
4 B6 a- b+ n! @) A9 uadjustments.
 This marks the beginning of what will be a turbulent social and political period, where elements of the social
3 Y# Z$ ?6 U: \; a2 i. }+ psafety nets in Western economies are no longer affordable and must be defunded.
 Templates for fiscal adjustment are appearing in peripheral and core Europe, the U.S. and elsewhere. There are
lessons to be learned from the frontrunners.
 We see policy interventions playing a bigger role in financial markets. Policymakers are trying to ease these
adjustments for governments and consumers as they deleverage.
5 _8 j7 Q: B9 K& y! M$ s& m Policy interventions are shaping markets more than fundamentals. Examples include the U.S. Federal Reserve’s
quantitative easing (QE2) program and the ECB intervention in the European sovereign bond market.
. F# p1 }4 V) W Developed financial markets have now priced in lower levels of economic growth.
 Credit markets are now less resilient to shocks because of Basel III and the Dodd-Frank bill. Brokers have
reduced capacity to hold risk. Therefore, risk shedding by others is going to have a greater impact.

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Current situation
+ N  j0 p+ Z3 Z: u The lesson we learned from the 2008-2009 credit crunch is how credit markets affect stock valuations. As long
3 L& X! l+ P, [; qas funding markets stay open, equities are valued as going concerns. But if credit markets close, markets may
7 \/ s) O" u+ \) X% Eimpose liquidation values.
 In the summer, the European credit crisis caused another round of market worries about a credit shutdown. In
August, we said a credit shutdown was unlikely – we continue to hold that view.
9 A% [. H5 Q, v" q: k7 a. x5 I The collapse of interest rates on 10-year Treasuries to 2% leaves banks, insurance companies and pension
$ R- R% p+ H/ L; h: A0 b; Dscrambling for higher yields to satisfy their obligations – this is supportive of corporate bond markets.
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2 F/ w2 u" ]9 MA look at credit markets
 Investment grade – $17 billion in new issues were placed last Wednesday. We’re expecting $80-$100 billion in
5 R: z% Y9 w9 R; T0 R5 E2 eSeptember. Non-financial investment grade is the new safe haven.
7 J( b5 r* B8 O6 F7 R High yield – In March, the spread above governments was 450 basis points, today it’s 740 bps. Yields were 7%
then, now they are 8.5%. New issuance has been about $30 billion a month, although August saw only $1
billion. That said, the market is still open. Risk has been repriced – but appropriately priced issues still have
& g9 w: Z# u5 g6 V+ j' Baccess to the market. There are only two parts of the global bond market having difficulty – ultra-low-grade
CCC issues and European high yield, which are both down about 2.5% year-to-date. All other bond markets are
% S. O9 t6 x( v6 {positive for the year-do-date, including high yield.
7 U4 T/ }* W0 q" g/ `0 X Mortgages – There is no funding for new construction, but existing quality properties are having no trouble
7 ?( C* k* c5 z7 Q# a3 p# Rfinding financing.
 Commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) – In the summer, there were two failed transactions, but they
7 F1 X3 Q/ f* X) O% Ywere subsequently repriced and placed. In the fall, there will be more deals.
4 |& e/ w! N$ U) x) X* e& m- |2 C Leveraged floating rate collateralized loans – The index was trading at $90 last September, $96 in March and
6 \: d. H4 w+ ?' o" Bis now back to $90. Changes were a result of interest rate expectations (people thought that interest rates were
% R2 l8 z6 n4 u0 r* Jgoing up) rather than liquidity. Chapter 11 companies have no problem getting secured and when they file for
2 H8 n' t: H, D: @+ L' wbankruptcy, they already have debt financing in place.
4 j' ]& V. s, b European banks – European bank lending conditions are tighter. This is the weakest link in the financial chain
today.
0 }3 j: I: T. T Emerging markets – Sovereign rates have rallied along with U.S. Treasuries. High-grade corporates in
emerging markets have no problem with funding.

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European Union agenda
 Europe is frantic and will remain so for at least another four months – which is what we see as the timeline for
the Greek default.
# K& t$ i; Z6 a. B. D& r As we see it, the following firewalls need to be put in place:
1. Making sure that banks have enough capital and deposit insurance to survive a Greek default
2. The European Financial Stability Facility, which is to be used for the bank capital injection and sovereign
4 Q* k3 |3 S( b  H' X) `7 W8 Gdebt stabilization, needs government approvals.
3. Measures of assistance to help European banks to make $1.7 trillion in refinancing easier and allowing
banks to shrink their balance sheets over three years
4. More fiscal reform for Spain, Italy and France is a precondition for stable sovereign debt markets.
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! J; r. i, e6 r! nBeyond Greece
 The EFSF #2 plan announced in July was a toolkit to deal with the PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain),
but that was before Italy.
 It provided a $500-billion loan program, but $250 billion was already spoken for by the PIGS.
 It’s an undersized framework and if negative growth/interest rate dynamics keep investors from sponsoring the
* t  c; w& X: L+ lItalian bond market, the EU crisis will escalate further.
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/ V" y7 d$ N6 ^# {Conclusion
" D# b% B- \, L- O3 G3 v( Y We want to have safeguards in place and continue to be liquid, so that we can capitalize on future turbulence.

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