市场评论

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下面是九月八号Conference call 对市场评论的总结，贴出来，希望对大家有帮助。
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Market Commentary
Eric Bushell, Chief Investment Officer
6 E+ m. E) @9 ~4 G/ wJames Dutkiewicz, Portfolio Manager
Signature Global Advisors


Background remarks
 Governments’ costs associated with stabilizing the crisis, including recent government stimulus programs, are
9 w8 T( r. _; {as much as 20% or even 60% of GDP.
 Some governments have reached limits of sustainable debt loads and markets are beginning to insist on fiscal
adjustments.
3 t  s; ]' L! }7 v' U This marks the beginning of what will be a turbulent social and political period, where elements of the social
safety nets in Western economies are no longer affordable and must be defunded.
 Templates for fiscal adjustment are appearing in peripheral and core Europe, the U.S. and elsewhere. There are
3 t6 y8 v5 V4 dlessons to be learned from the frontrunners.
 We see policy interventions playing a bigger role in financial markets. Policymakers are trying to ease these
adjustments for governments and consumers as they deleverage.
 Policy interventions are shaping markets more than fundamentals. Examples include the U.S. Federal Reserve’s
. b. [) z% K% s: e( W! Y1 w) tquantitative easing (QE2) program and the ECB intervention in the European sovereign bond market.
 Developed financial markets have now priced in lower levels of economic growth.
 Credit markets are now less resilient to shocks because of Basel III and the Dodd-Frank bill. Brokers have
reduced capacity to hold risk. Therefore, risk shedding by others is going to have a greater impact.

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Current situation
 The lesson we learned from the 2008-2009 credit crunch is how credit markets affect stock valuations. As long
as funding markets stay open, equities are valued as going concerns. But if credit markets close, markets may
* b9 M* x( Q$ h; w. P1 Eimpose liquidation values.
7 v+ _% E# @0 x7 ^ In the summer, the European credit crisis caused another round of market worries about a credit shutdown. In
August, we said a credit shutdown was unlikely – we continue to hold that view.
; h0 [& p  |# `0 m$ @/ M1 z The collapse of interest rates on 10-year Treasuries to 2% leaves banks, insurance companies and pension
scrambling for higher yields to satisfy their obligations – this is supportive of corporate bond markets.

, T* c' D2 E, M2 z; {, OA look at credit markets
& E* G* u5 Z  L2 P- j# Z Investment grade – $17 billion in new issues were placed last Wednesday. We’re expecting $80-$100 billion in
September. Non-financial investment grade is the new safe haven.
+ r! |8 {! _4 ~  g" x High yield – In March, the spread above governments was 450 basis points, today it’s 740 bps. Yields were 7%
. B- m" W9 Z3 c$ mthen, now they are 8.5%. New issuance has been about $30 billion a month, although August saw only $1
) E4 Y* c. @6 X0 w! ^' cbillion. That said, the market is still open. Risk has been repriced – but appropriately priced issues still have
' C! h) L+ n1 L( `access to the market. There are only two parts of the global bond market having difficulty – ultra-low-grade
CCC issues and European high yield, which are both down about 2.5% year-to-date. All other bond markets are
1 W! s0 m& S' v6 r* m6 p, Fpositive for the year-do-date, including high yield.
% y2 `+ u  w  \! G Mortgages – There is no funding for new construction, but existing quality properties are having no trouble
finding financing.
 Commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) – In the summer, there were two failed transactions, but they
were subsequently repriced and placed. In the fall, there will be more deals.
3 D! {8 J' }# w$ T Leveraged floating rate collateralized loans – The index was trading at $90 last September, $96 in March and
is now back to $90. Changes were a result of interest rate expectations (people thought that interest rates were
/ ~& l. z! r6 I, n" rgoing up) rather than liquidity. Chapter 11 companies have no problem getting secured and when they file for
) i' E: D/ n! I3 cbankruptcy, they already have debt financing in place.
7 V4 N( A; I. {/ _; ~ European banks – European bank lending conditions are tighter. This is the weakest link in the financial chain
today.
1 p' Z9 ~1 `& A Emerging markets – Sovereign rates have rallied along with U.S. Treasuries. High-grade corporates in
/ B+ A, N  z, d1 m9 ~emerging markets have no problem with funding.

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European Union agenda
+ h7 Q& w1 {" s* m Europe is frantic and will remain so for at least another four months – which is what we see as the timeline for
  G1 ?7 B& I$ Q- ~! g  M. Cthe Greek default.
7 e1 o6 |- T: Q  O7 u As we see it, the following firewalls need to be put in place:
) Q% v3 }$ R$ L! k1. Making sure that banks have enough capital and deposit insurance to survive a Greek default
2 q9 C$ ?- H% }! }/ V) [! K5 s2. The European Financial Stability Facility, which is to be used for the bank capital injection and sovereign
debt stabilization, needs government approvals.
% j1 T; v) U. x  V. u! [/ k3. Measures of assistance to help European banks to make $1.7 trillion in refinancing easier and allowing
$ {* J! B; l! B$ K) q) T' Nbanks to shrink their balance sheets over three years
4. More fiscal reform for Spain, Italy and France is a precondition for stable sovereign debt markets.
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Beyond Greece
 The EFSF #2 plan announced in July was a toolkit to deal with the PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain),
but that was before Italy.
  \) y) w: L  Y6 t* e It provided a $500-billion loan program, but $250 billion was already spoken for by the PIGS.
 It’s an undersized framework and if negative growth/interest rate dynamics keep investors from sponsoring the
Italian bond market, the EU crisis will escalate further.

& c3 W8 I, F; G. }, }Conclusion
2 X3 Y$ k' t* Z5 D$ O. W We want to have safeguards in place and continue to be liquid, so that we can capitalize on future turbulence.

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